Les économistes ont longtemps pensé que les services offerts par la nature avaient une valeur économique intrinsèque. Ces dernières années, les écologistes, d'autres scientifiques et plusieurs défenseurs de l'environnement se sont penchés sur les liens qui existent entre les systèmes naturels et la valeur économique. Cet intérêt croissant pour la valeur économique de la nature au cours des 20 dernières années a ainsi mené à la création de deux notions interreliées et maintenant largement utilisées : les services écosystémiques et le capital naturel. Dans cet article, pour contribuer à orienter la conception de politiques adéquates au Canada, j'analyse ce qui s'est fait ailleurs, et en particulier aux É tats-Unis, et j'explique pourquoi certains pays ont eu plus de succès que d'autres.
Introduction: Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital
Economists have long embraced the idea that services provided by nature have inherent economic value. 1 Indeed, the field of environmental and natural-resource economics is built on the notion of managing natural systems to enhance economic well-being. Scholars and practitioners in this field wrestle with questions such as how much to harvest or extract resources now and how much to leave for future generations; how to correct market failures that lead to excessive pollution; and how to conduct benefit-cost analysis that includes values like the protection of rare and endangered species.
Ecologists, other scientists, and many in the environmental advocacy community have more recently come to focus on the connection between natural systems and economic value. Ecologist Gretchen Daily's 1997 book, titled Nature's Services, was rightfully embraced by colleagues in the natural sciences, law, and other disciplines as a coherent case for the idea that nature has economic value and that excessive loss of natural ecosystems occurs because their full value is often not reflected in markets or commercial transactions. Soon after Daily's book, Paul Hawken and Lovins (1999) reached a similarly broad audience with their book Natural Capitalism. These works started a trend that brought in even more scholars from many disciplines into this line of inquiry. Economists, perhaps wishing to reclaim some of the territory that was once primarily theirs, also turned more attention to the emerging field with influential theoretical and empirical work. 2 The broadening interest in the economic value of nature over the last two decades led to the emergence of the interrelated and now commonly used terms ecosystem services and natural capital. Ecosystem services refer to the flow of goods and services generated by natural systems that are beneficial to humans. Figure 1 shows the tremendous growth in the field over the last two decades based on the number of Google Scholar results for scientific articles using the term ''ecosystem services '' from 1995 to 2013. Because ecosystem services produce value for humankind, they can in principle be expressed in monetary terms (i.e., a willingness to pay to obtain more of the service). Because they can be monetized, one can think of the economic value of natural capital just as economists do with any form of capital asset-that is, the natural capital's monetized value equals the present value of the monetized flow of ecosystem services provided over time. However, the fact that many ecosystem services do not become monetized leads them to be underprovided and leads natural capital to be undervalued. One way to remedy this problem, then, is to properly price nature and its services so that they can compete in a market environment, rather than fall victim to it. The objective in this work is not simply to place a price tag on everything; rather, it is to align economic incentives to properly treat nature's services.
Pricing Ecosystem Services: The Proposition
The economic case for pricing and paying for ecosystem services can be summarized as follows: 3 1. In many circumstances, markets work well to determine the services that ecosystems provide. However, markets favour traditional commodities such as timber, minerals, or crops. 2. Some ecosystem services, such as purified water, cleaner air, and storm protection, are at least as economically valuable as some traditional commodities produced on the same landscape (see, e.g., Barbier 2012). 3. However, the provision of many such ecosystem services is uncompensated and thus not considered by parties trying to get the best monetary return from their land. This leads to the environmentally degrading and economically inefficient loss of ecosystems services. 4. We can correct this problem by creating prices, markets, and other incentives for a wider range of ecosystem services, as well as decision-making mechanisms such as benefit-cost analysis to incentivize their provision and maintain existing natural capital.
This proposition has been accepted by many decisionmakers in the public and private sectors and has led to the enactment of a range of voluntary and mandatory actions to incentivize ecosystem service provision and avoid loss and degradation of existing ecosystems. To inform Canadian policy, this paper discusses some of the efforts that have been enacted elsewhere, with particular emphasis on those in the United States, and explains why some have been more successful than others.
Experiences Abroad with Ecosystem Services
The pricing and valuing of ecosystem services have taken several different forms in policy abroad, as described briefly below.
Public Payments for Ecosystem Services
In many countries, governments have established programs to pay landholders for providing ecosystem services. Although it predates the common use of the term payment for ecosystem services (PES), among the largest and most prominent of these is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a land-conservation program administered by the US Department of Agriculture. Farmers bid to enroll in the program, for which they receive an annual rental payment in exchange for removing environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production. They may also receive cost-share payments for adopting environmentally beneficial practices. Collectively, these practices should establish land cover that improves water quality, prevents soil erosion, and reduces loss of wildlife habitat. CRP contracts are 10-15 years in length and renewable. Farmers bid to participate and are assigned an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) score, which allows program administrators to rank the bids against each other to choose among the bids that are enrolled each year. There are currently between 25 and 30 million acres (10-12 million hectares) enrolled, though the total has been as high as 40 million acres. Total CRP payments are about US$ 1.8 billion per year, and a review of academic studies suggests that the benefits of these public expenditures significantly outweigh these costs (Wu and Weber 2012 
Ecosystem Service Markets
An alternative to a government-financed PES program involves payments transacted through formal markets. Here, buyers and sellers come together (literally or figuratively) to exchange a defined quantity of ecosystem services (e.g., a hectare of land preserved, a pound of pollutant reduced, or a ton of carbon sequestered) for an established market price. When we use the term market, we think of this as involving numerous buyers and sellers collectively setting a competitive market price. We can also think of an individual buyer and seller seeking a single ''over the counter'' transaction for a negotiated price.
The supply side of the market is similar to the providers receiving payments in a government-run program: landholders or those otherwise with rights to the resource. However, in an ecosystem services market, the buyers are typically private entities who are willing to pay for the service. This willingness to pay can be driven by altruism, stewardship or a willingness to finance the provision of a public good. This is often referred to as the ''voluntary market.'' Alternatively, demand can be driven by environmental regulations when they allow regulated entities to comply by paying other parties to reduce pollution or improve environmental outcomes, presumably for a lower cost than they can. This is sometimes referred to as the use of ''offsets'' in a ''compliance market.'' I provide some market examples below.
Wetlands Mitigation Banking
Section 404 of the US Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of dredged or filled material into the waters of the United States, including wetlands. A permit can be issued for such activity only if: (a) it does not significantly degrade the nation's waterways, (b) no practical alternative exists that is less damaging, and (c) compensation will be provided for all remaining impacts (US EPA 2016a). In the case of wetlands, one viable form of impact compensation is to establish a wetland elsewhere that fulfills a similar function to the one lost or impaired through dredging or filling. In the last two decades, this has spurred the development of wetlands mitigation banks established by investors (public and private), wherein wetlands are restored and, once certified, generate credits that can be purchased by the parties to provide compensatory mitigation for wetland loss. Typically more than one hectare of wetland must be restored for the hectare of wetland lost or impaired. Aggregating these mitigation activities into creditgenerating banks rather than isolated actions yields economies of scale and scope. As of 2013, there were approximately 1,800 mitigation banks in the United States (US EPA 2016b).
Species Habitat Loss Compensation
In the wake of early successes with wetlands mitigation banking at the US federal level in the 1990s, the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) established a policy to encourage the development of conservation banks that preserve, enhance, restore, and/or establish species habitat. FWS entered into an agreement with the state of California, subsequently expanded to other states, to allow the use of these banks as a form of compensation against harm to federally listed species (endangered, threatened, candidates for listing, or otherwise speciesat-risk) (US FWS 2012). As with wetlands mitigation banks, conservation banks generate credits that can be purchased by parties to compensate for unavoidable adverse impacts on listed species as required, in this case, by the federal Endangered Species Act. Credit sales are limited to a certain geographic ''service area'' to ensure similar habitat benefits. As of 2011, 108 conservation banks had been approved by FWS (US FWS 2012).
The idea of using economic incentives to offset species habitat loss by restoring habitat elsewhere has caught on in other countries, such as EU Habitats & Birds Directives offsets, and China's Forest Revegetation Fee. Together, these and other similar programs create a market for compensatory mitigation (with streams and wetlands) of about US$3 billion per year (US FWS 2012).
Climate-mitigation Payments for Sequestered Carbon
The ecosystem service market with perhaps the largest value potential is for sequestered carbon and greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. Deforestation, agriculture, and other land-use change together account for about one quarter of global GHG emissions (IPCC 2014). Coastal and marine ecosystems add about another 1 percent, but these come from highly biodiverse stores of ''blue carbon'' such as mangroves, salt marshes, and sea grasses that provide many other environmental benefits S26 Murray besides carbon storage (Pendleton et al. 2012) . Most of the forest and blue-carbon emissions come from the tropical zones, while temperate-and boreal-zone forests collectively provide a carbon sink wherein the amount of CO 2 absorbed is greater than the amount lost. Lands can be managed to avoid carbon losses from conversion (e.g., deforestation) and to enhance carbon sequestration (e.g., reforestation or wetlands restoration). Studies have shown this activity to be relatively cost effective compared to GHG mitigation from other sectors across different geographies (Murray et al. 2005; Kindermann et al. 2008) . The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognizes the potential and has established programs for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation and carbon stock enhancement (''REDD+'').
Carbon sequestration and other land-based GHG mitigation activity can face practical challenges in creating verifiable credits for sale and use. Several concerns include the ability to retain the sequestered carbon over time (permanence), the possibility that conserving carbon in one place might simply shift extractive activity and carbon loss to other locations where their losses are not being counted (leakage), and the assurance that the GHG carbon (or other GHG flux) being credited would not have occurred without the compensation (additionality) (Murray, Sohngen, and Ross 2007) . The additionality issue is particularly important when credit ''stacking'' occurs, which is the receipt of revenues from several different ecosystem markets, whereby a subset of the payments may be sufficient to compensate the landowner for forgoing other uses of the land (Murray and Vegh 2016) .
Some GHG compliance systems, such as the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and California's emissions trading system, allow for forest carbon credits to be generated as emissions offsets for directly regulated sources, much like the compensatory mitigation described above. Studies have suggested that such mitigation potential could be quite large, into the tens of billions of US dollars (Murray, Lubowski, and Sohngen 2009 ), but to date, actual market uptake has been a fraction of that, less than US$50 million per year, given the slow progress on GHG compliance systems worldwide and resistance in some quarters to the inclusion of forest carbon credits in compliance systems (Ecosystem Marketplace 2013). Meanwhile, forest carbon credit activity in the voluntary market has been more robust, with annual transactions amounting to nearly US$200 million (Ecosystem Marketplace 2013).
Water-quality Trading
Many developed countries have tackled water-pollution problems by regulating point sources such as factories and water treatment plants. In the United States, for example, surface water quality has improved tremendously since the nation's Clean Water Act mandated point-source controls in the early 1970s. However, these improvements have levelled off in the last decade as returns to further point-source controls diminish and non-point sources such as agricultural and urban runoff remain more loosely regulated (US EPA 2016c). One option is to incentivize farmers and other landowners to change practices, such as establishing riparian buffers or reducing the field application of nutrients, that reduce pollutant discharges into waterways and provide other ecosystem services. This can be done either by setting a limit on discharges (e.g., the total maximum daily load of a nutrient such as nitrogen or phosphorous), allowing trading of permits tied to these limits, and either including farmers and landowners as regulated sources or allowing them to voluntarily sell reduction credits to regulated entities such as water-treatment plants or land developers.
These programs have operated on a pilot scale in several places, generating relatively small market value (less than US$10 million per year) (Ecosystem Marketplace 2013), but they may grow in size as new regional nutrient-trading programs take hold. The state of Virginia, which borders the Chesapeake Bay, the second largest estuary in the United States, has instituted a nutrient trading program in which farmers conserve land and generate phosphorous-reduction credits that can be sold to road-project developers via a credit bank (Virginia Department of Environmental Quality 2016).
Mixed ES Payment Programs
Numerous examples of economic incentive programs for ecosystem services have a mix of characteristics described above. Some combine traditional government payment programs with market features, while others are purely private-sector initiatives. Others involve negotiated transactions among a small number of parties that are not mandated by law. And others convert environmental charges against some entities and use the proceeds to pay landholders for environmental improvements. Some examples of these mixed-payment programs are provided in Table 1 .
The Path Ahead: Can PES Live up to the Hype?
This article opened with the proposition that pricing and paying for ecosystem services will increase their provision. Logic dictates that, and evidence over the past 20 years has supported this in some, but not all, cases. Some ES payment programs have thrived, while others have faltered. I offer some concluding thoughts about factors that drive and limit success. Some of the largest and, arguably, most successful PES programs in practice are those that involve conventional government payment programs to private landholders, such as the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States and biodiversity conservation payments in the United Kingdom. These can provide a steady and predictable stream of revenues to landholders that will compensate them for practices that provide public benefits but may be less profitable. They do, however, require a sizeable and steady commitment of resources from governments to ensure that services are maintained over time. Such commitments are harder to come by in developing countries and, more recently, in fiscally strapped developed countries. These programs alone cannot deliver additional ES provision at scale.
e Mandates are often needed to drive ES market demand One might be tempted to view ES markets as a form of ''free market'' environmentalism with buyers simply willing to pay for the private provision of public goods. While there are some notable cases of this, such as certified products, the fact remains that most ES market action thus far has come through regulatory mandates that allow ES provision as a form of compliance flexibility. Prominent examples included compensatory mitigation for the loss of wetlands and endangered species habitat driving a robust market for that activity. These compliance programs impose unambiguous restrictions on certain activities such as wetland clearing, but they recognize that not all losses can be avoided in practice and thereby allow parties responsible for these losses to pay other parties to provide offsetting gains in ES. Although there are some voluntary markets for these forms of compensatory mitigation, these markets are very small relative to the markets driven by regulatory mandate. 4 Therefore, much of what is sold in these ES markets is simply replacing what is being lost elsewhere. 5 While this is clearly an improvement over allowing these 
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losses to accumulate unabated, these markets are not necessarily leading to net increases in ES provision or protection over time, unless their success convinces policy-makers that they can set more ambitious goals because of the cost flexibility allowed. It is notable that the lack of water-quality trading is due largely to a lack of regulatory compliance demand that allows it, rather than a failure to demonstrate that changes in land practices can be a very cost-effective alternative to pointsource controls for nutrient loadings into waterways. A similar assertion can be made regarding the lack of terrestrial carbon market trading being due primarily to the limited cases of GHG compliance rules that allow terrestrial carbon mitigation.
e Terrestrial carbon sequestration is a prominent example of an ES market held up by lack of regulatory demand
As asserted above, global commitments to reduce GHGs could create very large financial incentives (in the tens of billions of US dollars) to reduce deforestation, increase forest cover, and otherwise promote sustainable land use. However, efforts to negotiate global and domestic agreements to control GHGs have been slow in forming-as has the role for forest carbon sequestration and land-use change as a compliance mechanism in any such agreements. The UNFCCC negotiated a new global GHG reduction agreement in Paris in late 2015 which may help clarify the demand for forest and landuse mitigation actions after 2020, but as of this writing (early 2016) there is great uncertainty about the role of forests and land use as countries implement their Paris pledges. Previous agreements such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol had a very limited role for forests and land use, though efforts to advance their roles in such a future agreement have come a long way (Estrada et al. 2014) . It seems likely that if the Paris agreement does not have a substantial role for forests and land use, either through compliance markets or large-scale publicfinance commitments, then climate-related finance for forest protection and sustainable land use will fall well short of the expectations of the last decade.
e Supply chain initiatives could take up some of the demand slack
If government payment programs hold steady and compliance demand for ES stays soft, then supply-chain initiatives may be needed to increase the demand for ES provision or at least reduce demand for ES loss through conventional practices. To be clear, environmental supply-chain initiatives such as those enacted by individual large retailers or large consortia of companies are effectively private-sector mandates on the suppliers who wish to serve certain markets (United Nations Global Compact n.d.). As such, they can provide a combination of ''carrot and stick'' incentives to guide compliance. However, it is difficult to predict the extent to which land practices and ES will change as a result of these initiatives, given that objectives are often hazy and outcomes difficult to quantify. Recent experiences with industry-driven moratoria on soybeans from deforested land in the Amazon, though, have shown some signs of success in reducing deforestation there (Gibbs et al. 2015) .
Conclusions
The notion that markets and other social institutions do not properly account for the value of goods and services that nature provides is a powerful one that has great relevance for Canadian public policy. Though this has been known for some time, actions to address the problem through policy and market reform are a fairly recent phenomenon. However, the significant attention directed toward ecosystem services by academics, nongovernmental organizations, business leaders, and policymakers has not yet been matched by action on the ground at a scale that corresponds to that attention. There are certainly examples in many countries of governmentfunded programs that pay private parties to protect land, modify management practices, and undertake other actions to provide and sustain ecosystem services. Canadian officials at the level of national, provincial, and local governments can learn from those that have worked well. However, government budgets are not likely to provide sufficient funds to meet ecosystem enhancement needs at the scale seen by many as necessary to ensure the sustainable provision of ecosystem services over time. Thus more market-oriented systems with decentralized exchanges between private buyers and sellers are widely believed to provide substantial potential for ecosystem enhancement at a larger scale. However, these mechanisms have not emerged to the level that many observers thought they would a decade ago. A main reason for this is that these decentralized markets typically need environmental regulations to be the ultimate source of demand-that is, regulatory compliance with flexibility mechanisms that enable ecosystem-sourced compliance credits. Voluntary markets have had some isolated successes but do not appear to send a strong enough signal to motivate substantial landscape change. One impediment to those markets is the transaction costs that are incurred to get the activity up and running. Transaction costs are typically a problem for any mechanism at the inception stages when economies of scale are not present. Ambitious and comprehensive regulation that limits pollutants such as greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and nutrient loadings into water bodies could provide both the scale necessary for these transaction costs to come down and the demand necessary to pull ecosystem service provision into the market more extensively.
A closing comment on scale is in order. The proposition put forth in this paper is that unpriced ecosystem services are underprovided, but by how much? The suggestion throughout has been that these services are vastly underprovided and that the problem needs to be addressed at a ''large scale.'' This is certainly true, for instance, of efforts to reduce the global loss of forests, with studies showing that payments for carbon retention in forests of $10-30/t CO 2 could offset global emissions of greenhouse gases by 12-20 percent, by avoiding the deforestation of millions of hectares per year and expanding forest areas and carbon stock on existing forests (Murray et al. 2009 ). But in general, the question of how much specific ecosystem services are underprovided (how much is enough?) is an empirical question that depends on the type and location of ecosystem services in question. Policy-makers should evaluate the issue of the scale of intervention carefully when designing and funding programs to ensure that resources are being properly allocated to the correct problems at the appropriate level.
Notes
1 Economists since David Ricardo in the nineteenth century have grappled with how to integrate the natural environment into economics, though specific efforts to place monetary value on nature emerged in the mid-twentieth century with the advent of environmental economics. See for instance, Krutilla and Fisher (1975) . 2 See Heal (2000) for some relatively early writing by an economist on ecosystem services; for a more recent view, see Perrings (2014) . 3 For brevity, I will often use the term ecosystem services and natural capital interchangeably, though the former expresses the flow of services and the latter reflects the stock generating that flow. 4 According to the Ecosystem Marketplace (2013) matrix, the global compliance market for biodiversity mitigation is about US$3 billion, while the voluntary market is US$25 million (less than 1 percent of the compliance market). 5 With the proviso that many of these trading programs do impose trading ratios that require a more than 1:1 replacement of the ES lost.
